OFFICE  OF  NAVAL  INTELLIGENCE. 


C\  VA 


INFORMATION  FROM  ABROAD. 


VIEWS 


DMIRAL  CERVERA 


REGARDING 


THE  SPANISH  NAVY  IN  THE  LATE  WAR. 


NOVEMBER,  1808. 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT, 

Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT  printing  office. 
1898. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


Under  the  title  “Vindication  of  the  Navy”  there  appeared  in  the  La  Epoca 
Madrid,  November  5,  1898,  this  article,  which  is  made  up  mainly  of  extracts 
from  letters  from  Admiral  Cervera,  written  previous  to  the  declaration  of  war 
and  continued  to  May  5.  These  letters  were  written  by  Admiral  Cervera  in 
protest  against  Spain  rushing  into  war  in  face  of  certain  defeat,  due  to  the  naval 
strength  of  the  United  States  and  the  unpreparedness  of  the  Spanish  navy. 

Cervera  writes:  “I  ask  myself  if  it  is  right  for  me  to  keep  silent,  and  thereby 
make  myself  an  accomplice  in  adventures  which  will  surely  cause  the  total  ruin 
of  Spain.  And  for  what  purpose?  To  defend  an  island  which  was  ours  but 
belongs  to  us  no  more,  because  even  if  we  should  not  lose  it  by  right  in  the  war, 
we  have  lost  it  in  fact,  and  with  it  all  wealth  and  an  enormous  number  of  young 
men,  victims  of  the  climate  and  bullets,  in  the  defense  of  what  is  now  no  more 
than  a  romantic  ideal.  Furthermore,  I  believe  that  this  opinion  of  mine  should 
be  known  to  the  Queen,  and  by  the  whole  council  of  ministers. 

“  *  *  *  If  our  correspondence  of  the  last  two  months  is  looked  over  it 
will  be  seen  not  that  I  have  been  a  prophet,  but  that  I  have  fallen  short  of  the 
true  mark.  Let  us  not  have  any  illusions  as  to  what  we  can  do.  *  *  * 

‘  ‘  I  have  deemed  it  my  duty  to  express  my  opinions  to  the  proper  authorities 
clearly  and  without  beating  around  the  bush.  Now,  let  orders  be  given  to  me; 
I  will  carry  them  out  with  energy  and  decision.  I  am  ready  for  the  worst.” 

Spain  had  neglected  her  navy,  and  Cervera  shows  it  was  imprudent  for  her  to 
attempt  war  against  a  superior  naval  power. 

Richardson  Clover, 

Chief  Intelligence  Officer. 

Navy  Department, 

Office  of  Naval  Intelligence, 

April  29,  1898. 


(3) 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/viewsregardingspOOcerv 


THE  VINDICATION  OF  THE  NAVY. 


(From  “La  Epoca,”  Madrid,  November  5,  1898.) 


The  first  judgment  of  a  part  of  the  public  concerning  the  con¬ 
duct  of  the  navy  in  the  combats  of  Cavite  and  Santiago  has  been 
already  much  modified.  In  the  face  of  the  evidence  of  official 
reports ;  of  the  praises  and  expressions  of  respect  and  admiration 
of  the  victors  toward  those  who  fought  against  them  under  disad¬ 
vantageous  circumstances ;  of  the  technical  explanations  given  by 
foreign  and  Spanish  scientific  authorities,  the  unjust  accusations 
of  the  first  few  days  have  faded  away. 

But  still  more  complete  must  be  the  vindication  of  the  navy, 
which  has  been  treated  with  unjust  severity  and  manifest  partial¬ 
ity,  when  justice  compels  us  to  acknowledge  that  in  all  the  events 
of  the  war  the  navy  has  done  all  that  could  be  asked  of  it,  con¬ 
sidering  its  limited  means ;  and  that  not  only  has  it  done  its  duty 
in  naval  actions,  but  it,  has  also  assisted  the  action  of  the  land 
forces,  as  for  instance  in  Santiago,  now  mounting  and  serving  the 
batteries,  which  made  it  possible  to  prolong  the  resistance  of  the 
city,  now  landing  its  crews  and  fighting  in  the  trenches  so  heroic¬ 
ally  that  it  was  these  naval  forces  that  suffered  the  greatest  losses. 

As  regards  Admiral  Cervera  and  his  conduct  from  the  time  he 
took  command  of  the  fleet  until  the  terrible  battle  of  Santiago, 
we  feel  sure  that  not  only  will  the  supreme  council  of  war  and 
marine  recognize  that  he  carried  the  fulfillment  of  duty  to  the 
last  possible  extreme,  but  also  that  public  opinion  will  have  to 
atone  to  him  for  the  injustice  with  which  he  has  been  treated,  and 
will  surround  him  with  the  respect  deserved  by  those  who,  subor¬ 
dinating  every  consideration  to  the  love  of  their  country,  pointed 
out  to  those  who  were  blind  the  abyss  toward  which  they  were 
conducting  the  nation.  His  advice  and  representations  were  not 
heeded,  and  he  heroically  complied  with  the  law  of  obedience, 
under  which  are  all  who  wear  the  honorable  military  uniform. 

We  will  not  refer,  for  the  present,  to  the  battle  of  Santiago, 
which  is  now  sub  judice ,  but  full  light  will  be  thrown  upon  this 
subject  in  due  time.  But  previous  events  demonstrate  the  fore¬ 
thought  of  Rear  Admiral  Cervera  and  the  lamentable  blindness  of 
those  who  would  not  hear  him,  and  are  sufficient  for  the  vindica¬ 
tion  of  the  sailors  of  Santiago. 


(5) 


6 


From  documents  known  by  many  chiefs  and  officers  of  the  navy 
it  appears  that  Admiral  Cervera  expressed  himself  always  ready  to 
give  absolute  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  government;  that  he 
pointed  out  the  dangers  of  a  disastrous  war  with  the  United  States 
while  it  was  still  possible  to  avoid  it ;  that  he  repeatedly  reported  the 
deficiencies  in  the  vessels  under  his  command ;  that  he  persistently 
offered  to  come  to  Madrid  to  explain  to  the  council  of  ministers 
the  reasons  why  our  fleet  was  going  to  certain  destruction ;  that 
he  was  not  allowed  to  explain  these  reasons  to  those  about  to  take 
upon  themselves  the  enormous  responsibility  of  this  war;  that  he 
was  forced  to  sail  without  a  war  plan,  against  his  opinion  and  that 
of  all  the  commanders  of  the  fleet,  who  signed  a  solemn  protest 
declining  the  responsibility  of  the  consequences ;  that  finally  many 
of  the  elements  indispensable  to  put  the  ships  in  a  fair  condition 
were  not  supplied  to  him ;  that  the  Colon  sailed  without  her  tur¬ 
ret  artillery,  and  some  of  the  Bilbao  cruisers  with  some  of  the 
pieces  and  ammunition  defective,  and  at  least  one  of  them  with 
her  speed  very  much  reduced  on  account  of  the  state  of  her 
bottom. 

Though  they  possessed  such  conclusive  and  justifying  docu¬ 
ments,  those  officers  had  the  self-denial,  the  patriotism,  and  the 
spirit  of  discipline  not  to  reply  to  the  attacks  made  against  them, 
thus  setting  a  fine  example  which  is  very  rare  in  these  times  of 
personal  and  corps  egotism,  general  insubordination,  and  wild  pas¬ 
sions.  This  noble  conduct  makes  it  still  more  necessary  to  give 
full  satisfaction  to  the  navy  by  making  public,  when  the  Cortes 
meet,  all  the  official  correspondence  exchanged  between  Admiral 
Cervera  and  the  minister  of  marine,  as  well  as  the  supplementary 
private  documents  bearing  on  the  subject. 

W e  have  had  occasion  to  see  some  of  these  documents,  and  we 
wish  to  anticipate  that  justification,  and  to  show  that  in  reality 
it  was  not  Cervera  who  lost  the  fleet,  but  those  who,  against  the 
opinion  of  the  Admiral  and  the  commanders  of  the  fleet,  without 
even  hearing  Cervera’s  representations,  sent  the  vessels  to  fight 
under  such  conditions  that  they  had  to  perish,  thus  sacrificing  to 
the  vain  and  noisy  outcry  of  our  jingoes  the  best  vessels  of  Spain 
and  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  brave  men. 

Present  circumstances  prevent  us,  at  this  time,  from  making 
known  much  interesting  data.  However,  the  following  is  quite 
sufficient,  we  believe,  to  form  a  more  just  opinion  of  our  navy. 

In  January,  1898,  Admiral  Cervera  wrote  to  one  of  his  relatives: 

DEFICIENCIES  OF  THE  NAVAL  INDUSTRY. 

“  About  two  years  ago  I  wrote  you  a  letter  concerning  our  con¬ 
dition  to  go  to  war  with  the  United  States.  I  requested  you  to 
keep  that  letter  in  case  some  day  it  should  be  necessary  to  bring  it 


7 


to  light  in  defense  of  my  memory  or  myself  when  we  had  experi¬ 
enced  the  sad  disappointment  prepared  for  ns  by  the  stupidity  of 
some,  the  cnpidity  of  others,  and  the  incapability  of  all,  even  of 
those  with  the  best  of  intentions. 

4  4  To-day  we  find  ourselves  again  in  one  of  those  critical  periods 
which  seem  to  be  the  beginning  of  the  end,  and  I  write  you  again 
to  express  my  point  of  view  and  to  explain  my  action  in  this  mat¬ 
ter,  and  I  beg  you  to  put  this  letter  with  the  other  one,  so  that  the 
two  may  be  my  military  testament. 

44  The  relative  military  positions  of  Spain  and  the  United  States 
has  grown  worse  for  us,  because  we  are  extenuated,  absolutely 
penniless,  and  they  are  very  rich,  and  also  because  we  have 
increased  our  naval  power  only  with  the  Colon  and  the  torpedo 
destroyers,  and  they  have  increased  theirs  much  more. 

44  What  I  have  said  of  our  industry  is  sadly  confirmed  in  every¬ 
thing  we  look  at.  There  is  the  Cataluna,  begun  more  than  eight 
years  ago,  and  her  hull  is  not  yet  completed.  And  this  when  we 
are  spurred  on  by  danger,  which  does  not  wake  patriotism  in  any¬ 
body,  while  jingoism  finds  numerous  victims,  perhaps  myself 
to-morrow.  And  the  condition  of  our  industry  is  the  same  in  all 
the  arsenals. 

44  Let  us  consider,  now,  our  private  industries.  The  Maquinista 
Terrestre  y  Maritima  supplies  the  engines  of  the  Alfonso  XIII ; 
Cadiz  the  Filipinas.  If  the  Carlos  V  is  not  a  dead  failure,  she  is 
not  what  she  should  be ;  everything  has  been  sacrificed  to  speed, 
and  she  lacks  power.  And  remember,  that  the  construction  is 
purely  Spanish.  The  Company  of  La  Grana  has  not  completed 
its  ships,  as  I  am  told.  Only  the  Vizcaya,  Oquendo ,  and  Maria 
Teresa  are  good  ships  of  their  class ;  but,  though  constructed  at 
Bilbao,  it  was  by  Englishmen.  Thus,  manifestly,  even  victory 
would  be  a  sad  thing  for  us.  As  for  the  administration  and  its 
intricacies,  let  us  not  speak  of  that;  its  slow  procedure  is  killing 
us.  The  Vizcaya  carries  a  14-cm.  breech-plug  which  was  declared 
useless  two  months  ago,  and  I  did  not  know  it  until  last  night. 
And  that  because  an  official  inquiry  was  made.  How  many  cases 
I  might  mention!  But  my  purpose  is  not  to  accuse,  but  to  explain 
why  we  may  and  must  expect  a  disaster.  But  as  it  is  necessary  to 
go  to  the  bitter  end,  and  as  it  would  be  a  crime  to  say  that  publicly 
to-day,  I  hold  my  tongue,  and  go  forth  resignedly  to  face  the 
trials  which  God  may  be  pleased  to  send  me.  I  am  sure  that  we 
will  do  our  duty,  for  the  spirit  of  the  navy  is  excellent ;  but  I 
pray  God  that  the  troubles  may  be  arranged  without  coming  to  a 
conflict  which,  in  any  way,  I  believe  would  be  disastrous  for  us.” 


8 


STATE  OF  THE  FLEET. 

In  the  beginning  of  February  Admiral  Cevera  wrote  to  a  high 
official  personage: 

“Although  I  am  sure  that  I  am  telling  you  nothing  new,  I  think 
it  is  not  idle,  in  these  critical  times,  to  make  a  study  of  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  the  fleet.  We  must  discount  the  Alfonso  XIII ,  so  many 
years  under  trials  that  it  appears  we  shall  not  have  the  pleasure 
ever  to  count  it  among  our  vessels  of  war.  The  fleet  is  reduced 
to  the  three  Bilbao  cruisers,  the  Colon ,  the  Destructor ,  and 
the  torpedo  destroyers  Furor  and  Terror.  The  three  Bilbao 
battle  ships  are  practically  complete,  but  the  14-cm.  artillery,  the 
main  power  of  these  vessels,  is  practically  useless,  on  account  of 
the  bad  system  of  its  breech  mechanism,  and  the  bad  quality  of 
the  cartridge  cases,  of  which  there  are  only  those  on  board. 

“The  Colon ,  which  is  undoubtedly  the  best  of  all  our  ships 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  has  not  received  her  guns.  The 
Destructor  may  serve  as  a  scout,  although  its  speed  is  not  very 
high  for  this  service  in  the  fleet.  The  Furor  and  Terror  are 
in  a  good  condition,  but  I  doubt  if  they  can  make  effective 
use  of  their  75-mm.  pieces.  As  for  the  supplies  necessary  for  a 
fleet,  we  frequently  lack  even  the  most  necessary.  In  this  arsenal 
(Cadiz)  we  have  not  been  able  to  coal,  and  both  at  Barcelona  and 
Cadiz  we  could  only  obtain  half  of  the  biscuit  we  wanted,  and 
that  only  because  I  had  ordered  8,000  kilos  to  be  made  here.  We 
have  no  charts  of  the  American  seas,  although  I  suppose  that 
they  have  been  ordered;  but  at  the  present  time  we  could  not 
move.  Apart  from  this  deficient  state  of  the  material,  I  have  the 
pleasure  to  state  that  the  spirit  of  the  personnel  is  excellent,  and 
that  the  country  will  find  it  all  that  it  may  choose  to  demand.  It 
is  a  pity  that  a  lack  of  better  and  more  abundant  material,  greater 
supplies,  and  less  hindrances  are  wanting  to  put  this  personnel  in 
a  condition  to  amply  carry  out  its  role !  ” 

*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

“  I  note,”  said  the  Admiral  in  another  letter,  “what  I  am  told 
concerning  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  Colon.  It  is  to  be  very  much 
regretted  that  there  is  always  so  much  underhand  work  about 
everything,  and  that  there  should  be  so  much  of  it  now  regarding 
the  acceptance  of  the  254-mm.  guns,  because  if  we  finally  take 
them,  it  will  seem  that  we  are  yielding  to  certain  disagreeable  im¬ 
positions,  and  if  things  come  to  the  worst,  it  seems  to  me  we  will 
have  to  accept,  as  the  proverb  says,  ‘  hard  bread  rather  than  none  ’ ; 
and  if  we  have  no  other  guns,  and  these  ones  can  fire  at  least  25  or 
30  shots,  we  will  have  to  take  them  anyhow,  even  though  they  are 
expensive  and  inefficient.  And  we  must  not  lose  time,  so  that  the 


9 


vessel  may  be  armed  and  supplied  with  ammunition  as  soon  as 
possible.” 

Some  time  afterwards,  when  matters  were  getting  worse  and 
worse,  the  Admiral  was  more  explicit  still.  Shortly  after  the  Dupuy 
de  Lome  incident  he  said : 

“I  do  not  know  when  the  Pelayo  and  the  Carlos  V  will  be  able  to 
join  the  fleet,  but  I  suspect  that  they  will  not  arrive  in  time.  Of  the 
first  one  I  know  nothing  at  all,  but  I  have  received  some  news  con¬ 
cerning  the  second  one,  and  certainly  not  very  satisfactory  as  re¬ 
gards  the  time  it  will  take  for  it  to  be  ready.  It  seems  to  me  that 
there  is  a  mistake  in  the  calculation  of  the  forces  we  may  count 
upon  in  the  sad  event  of  a  war  with  the  United  States.  In  the 
Cadiz  division  I  believe  the  Numancia  will  be  lacking.  I  do  not 
think  we  can  count  on  the  Lepanto.  Of  the  Carlos  V  and  the 
Pelayo  I  have  already  spoken.  The  Colon  has  not  yet  received 
her  artillery,  and  if  war  comes,  she  will  be  caught  without  her 
heavy  artillery.  The  eight  principal  vessels  of  the  Havana  station 
have  no  military  value  whatever,  and,  besides,  are  badly  worn  out, 
therefore  they  can  be  of  very  little  use.  In  saying  this  I  am  not 
moved  by  a  fault-finding  spirit,  but  only  by  a  desire  to  avoid  illu¬ 
sions  that  may  cost  us  very  dear. 

“Taking  things  as  they  are,  however  sad  it  may  be,  it  is  seen 
that  our  naval  force  when  compared  with  that  of  the  United  States 
is  approximately  in  the  proportion  of  1  to  3.  It  therefore  seems  to 
me  a  dream,  almost  a  feverish  fancy,  to  think  that  with  this  force, 
extenuated  by  our  long  wars,  we  can  establish  the  blockade  of  any 
port  of  the  United  States.  A  campaign  against  them  will  have  to 
be,  at  least  for  the  present,  a  defensive  or  a  disastrous  one,  unless 
we  have  some  alliances,  in  which  case  the  tables  may  be  turned. 
As  for  the  offensive,  all  we  could  do  would  be  to  make  some  raids 
with  our  fast  vessels  in  order  to  do  them  as  much  harm  as  possible. 
It  is  frightful  to  think  of  the  results  of  a  naval  battle,  even  if  it 
should  be  a  successful  one  for  us,  for  how  and  where  would  we 
repair  our  damages?  I,  however,  will  not  refuse  to  do  what  may 
be  judged  necessary,  but  I  think  it  convenient  to  analyze  the  situa¬ 
tion  such  as  it  is,  without  cherishing  illusions  which  may  bring 
about  terrible  disappointments.” 

COMPARISON  OF  THE  FLEETS. 

The  comparison  of  both  navies,  based  upon  the  studies  made  in 
prevision  of  a  war  with  the  United  States,  suggested  to  the  Admi¬ 
ral  the  following  considerations  on  February  25,  1898 : 

“If  we  compare  the  Navy  of  the  United  States  with  our 
own,  counting  only  modern  vessels  capable  of  active  service, 


10 


we  find  that  the  United  States  have  the  battle  ships  Iowa ,  Indi¬ 
ana,  Massachusetts,  Oregon,  and  Texas ;  the  armored  cruisers 
Brooklyn  and  New  York;  the  protected  crnisers  Atlanta,  Min¬ 
neapolis,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  Chicago,  Cincinnati,  Columbia, 
Newark,  San  Francisco,  Olympia,  Philadelphia,  and  Raleigh, 
and  the  rapid  unprotected  crnisers  Detroit ,  Marblehead,  and 
Montgomery .  Against  this  we  have,  following  the  same  classifi¬ 
cation,  the  battle  ships  Pelayo,  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Vizcaya, 
and  Oquendo ,  armored  cruiser  Colon,  and  protected  cruisers  Car¬ 
los  V,  Alfonso  X III,  and  Lepanto;  no  fast  unprotected  cruisers ;  and 
all  this  supposing  the  Pelayo,  Carlos  V,  and  Lepanto  to  be  ready 
in  time,  and  giving  the  desired  value  to  the  Alfonso  XIII.  I  do 
not  mention  the  other  vessels  on  account  of  their  small  military 
value,  surely  inferior  to  that  of  the  nine  gunboats,  from  1,000  to 
1,600  tons  each,  six  monitors  still  in  service,  the  ram  Katahdin, 
the  Vesuvius ,  and  the  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers,  which  I  do  not 
count.  I  believe  that  in  the  present  form  the  comparison  is  accu¬ 
rate  enough. 

‘  ‘  Comparing  the  displacements,  we  find  that  in  battle  ships  the 
United  States  have  41,589  tons  against  our  3Q,917  tons;  in  armored 
cruisers  they  have  17,471  tons  against  our  6,840;  in  protected  cruis¬ 
ers  51,098  against  18,887,  and  in  fast  unprotected  cruisers  they  have 
6,287  and  we  none.  The  total  of  vessels  good  for  all  kinds  of  oper¬ 
ations  comprise  116,445  tons  against  56,644  tons,  or  something  less 
than  one-half. 

“In  speed  our  battle  ships  are  superior  to  theirs,  but  not  to  their 
armored  cruisers.  In  other  vessels  their  speed  is  superior  to  ours. 

“Comparing  the  artillery,  and  admitting  that  it  is.  possible  to 
fire  every  ten  minutes  the  number  of  shots  stated  in  the  respective 
reports,  and  that  only  one-half  of  the  pieces  of  less  than  20  cm.  are 
fired,  and  supposing  that  the  efficiency  of  each  shot  of  the  calibers 
32,  30,  28,  25,  20,  16,  15,  14,  12,  10,  17.5,  5.7,  4.7,  and  3.7  be  repre¬ 
sented  by  the  figures  328,  270,  220,  156,  80,  41,  33,  27,  17,  10,  4,  2, 
and  1,  which  are  the  hundredths  of  the  cubes  of  the  numbers  rep¬ 
resenting  their  calibers  expressed  in  centimeters 

we  find  that  the  artillery  power  of  the  American  battle  ships  is  ( 
represented  by  43,822,  and  that  of  ours  by  29,449;  that  of  the 
American  armored  cruisers  by  13,550,  and  that  of  ours  {Colon)  by 
6,573;  that  of  the  American  protected  cruisers  by  62,725,  and  that 
of  ours  by  14,600;  that  of  the  American  unprotected  cruisers  by 
12,300.  Therefore,  according  to  these  figures,  the  offensive  power 
of  the  artillery  of  the  United  States  vessels  will  be  represented  by 
132,397,  and  that  of  ours  by  50,622,  or  a  little  less  than  two-fifths 
of  the  enemy’s. 


11 


“To  arrive  at  this  appalling  conclusion  I  have  already  said  that 
it  has  been  necessary  to  count  the  Pelayo  and  Carlos  V,  which  prob¬ 
ably  will  not  be  ready  in  time ;  the  Lepanto ,  which  surely  will  not 
be  ready,  and  the  Alfonso  XIII ,  whose  speed  renders  her  of  a  very 
doubtful  utility. 

IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  AN  OFFENSIVE  CAMPAIGN. 

“Now,  to  carry  out  any  serious  operations  in  a  maritime  war, 
the  first  thing  necessary  is  to  secure  control  of  the  sea,  which  can 
only  be-  done  by  defeating  the  enemy’s  fleet,  or  rendering  them 
powerless  by  blockading  them  in  their  military  ports.  Can  we  do 
this  with  the  United  States?  It  is  evident  to  me  that  we  can  not. 
And  even  if  God  should  grant  us  a  great  victory,  against  what 
may  be  reasonably  expected,  where  and  how  would  we  repair  the 
damages  sustained?  Undoubtedly  the  port  would  be  Havana,  but 
with  what  resources  ?  I  am  not  aware  of  the  resources  existing 
there,  but  judging  by  this  department,  where  everything  is  scarce, 
it  is  to  be  assumed  that  the  same  condition  exists  everywhere,  and 
that  the  immediate  consequences  of  the  first  great  naval  battle 
would  be  the  enforced  inaction  of  the  greater  part  of  our  fleet  for 
the  rest  of  the  campaign,  whatever  might  be  the  result  of  that 
great  combat.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy  would  repair  its  dam¬ 
ages  inside  of  its  fine  rivers,  and  aided  by  its  powerful  industries 
and  enormous  resources.  This  lack  of  industries  and  stores  on 
our  part  renders  it  impossible  to  carry  on  an  offensive  campaign. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

“  If  the  control  of  the  sea  remains  in  the  hands  of  our  adversaries, 
they  will  immediately  make  themselves  masters  of  any  unfortified 
port  which  they  may  want  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  counting,  as  they 
do,  on  the  insurgents,  and  will  use  them  as  a  base  for  their  opera¬ 
tions  against  us.  The  transportation  of  troops  to  Cuba  would  be 
most  difficult  and  the  success  very  doubtful,  and  the  insurrection, 
without  the  check  of  our  army,  which  would  gradually  give  way, 
and  with  the  aid  of  the  Americans,  would  rapidly  increase  and 
become  more  formidable. 

4 4  These  reflections  are  very  sad ;  but  I  believe  it  to  be  my  una¬ 
voidable  duty  to  set  aside  all  personal  considerations  and  loyally 
to  represent  to  my  country  the  resources  which  I  believe  to  exist, 
so  that,  without  illusions,  it  may  weigh  the  considerations  for  and 
against,  and  then,  through  the  government  of  His  Majesty,  which 
is  the  country’s  legitimate  organ,  it  may  pronounce  its  decision. 
I  am  sure  that  this  decision  will  find  in  all  of  us  energetic,  loyal, 
and  decided  executors.  Our  motto  is  ‘the  fulfillment  of  duty.’” 


12 


MORE  DEFICIENCIES — THE  COUNTRY  MUST  BE  TOLD  THE  TRUTH. 

On  February  26  the  Admiral  wrote  the  following : 

4  4  When  I  received  yesterday  the  letter  in  which,  among  other 
things,  you  asked  me  if  the  Colon  could  go  out  for  target  practice, 

I  answered  that  the  vessel  was  ready,  and  at  the  same  time  I  took 
measures  so  that  the  cartridge  cases  which  might  be  used  in  that 
practice  should  be  recharged,  but  it  appears  that  there  is  no  fur¬ 
nace  in  which  they  can  be  reannealed,  or  a  machine  to  reform  the 
cartridge  cases.  The  extra  charges  which  the  vessel  brought  (72 
per  gun)  are  therefore  useless. 

44 1  send  to-day  the  official  letter  which  I  announced  yesterday. 
Its  conclusions  are  indeed  afflicting,  but  can  we  afford  to  cherish  illu¬ 
sions  ?  Do  we  not  owe  to  our  country  not  only  our  life  if  necessary, 
but  the  exposition  of  our  beliefs  ?  I  am  very  uneasy  about  this. 
I  ask  myself  if  it  is  right  for  me  to  keep  silent,  and'  thereby  make 
myself  an  accomplice  in  adventures  which  will  surely  cause  the 
total  ruin  of  Spain.  And  for  what  purpose  ?  To  defend  an  island 
which  was  ours  but  belongs  to  us  no  more,  because  even  if  we 
should  not  lose  it  by  right  in  the  war,  we  have  lost  it  in  fact,  and 
with  it  all  our  wealth  and  an  enormous  number  of  young  men, 
victims  of  the  climate  and  bullets,  in  the  defense  of  what  is  now 
no  more  than  a  romantic  ideal.  Furthermore,  I  believe  that  this 
opinion  of  mine  should  be  known  by  the  Queen,  and  by  the  whole 
council  of  ministers.” 

That  this  thoughtful  and  patriotic  advice  was  not  favorably  re¬ 
ceived  by  the  government  is  shown  by  the  following  letter  a  few 
days  afterwards : 

44  Yesterday  I  received  your  letter  of  the  28th,  and  I  regret  very 
much  the  painful  impressions  caused  by  my  remarks ;  but  I  am 
not  surprised,  because  they  are  truly  sad,  and  still,  perhaps,  they 
fall  beneath  the  mark,  judging  from  everything  one  sees.  Just 
now  we  have  another  proof  of  this  in  the  fact  that  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  cartridge  cases  for  the  Colon  arises  from  the  want  of 
means  (money),  and  this  on  the  eve,  perhaps,  of  a  war  against  the 
richest  nation  in  the  world.  I  do  not  wish  to  dwell  too  much  on 
this  point,  for  no  practical  result  could  be  obtained.  But  every 
detail  points  out  either  our  lack  of  means  or  our  defective  organi¬ 
zation,  and,  above  all,  our  utter  lack  of  preparation. 

44 1  have  deemed  it  my  duty  to  express  my  opinions  to  the  proper 
authorities  clearly  and  without  beating  around  the  bush.  Now 
let  orders  be  given  to  me ;  I  will  carry  them  out  with  energy  and 
decision.  I  am  ready  for  the  worst.” 


13 


MORE  DATA  REGARDING  OUR  INFERIORITY — DANGER  TO  THE 

PHILIPPINES. 

“An  examination  of  our  forces,”  said  the  Admiral  on  March 
25,  “based  upon  what  I  already  know  and  upon  recent  information 
and  observation,  not  only  confirms  what  I  said,  but  shows  it  to  be 
still  worse.  I  have  visited  the  Vitoria ,  on  which  I  counted,  and 
from  my  visit  I  have  drawn  the  conviction  that  we  can  not  count 
on  her  for  the  present  conflict.  Neither  does  my  information 
permit  me  to  count  on  the  Pelayo ,  Carlos  V ,  or  Numancia.  And 
yet,  as  this  opinion  is  not  based  upon  personal  observation,  I 
include  them  in  the  inclosed  statement.  Whatever  may  be  the 
direction  given  to  the  conflict,  either  war,  negotiations  direct,  or 
through  a  third  party,  an  arbitrator  or  otherwise,  the  longel  the 
decision  is  delayed  the  worse  it  will  be  for  us.  If  it  is  war,  the 
longer  it  takes  to  come  the  more  exhausted  we  will  be.  If  it  is 
negotiation  of  any  kind,  the  longer  it  is  postponed  the  greater  will 
be  the  demands,  each  time  more  irritating,  which  will  be  presented 
by  the  United  States,  and  to  which  we  will  have  to  yield  in  order 
to  gain  time  in  the  vain  hope  of  improving  our  military  position. 
And  as  our  position  can  not  be  improved,  let  us  see  what  we  can 
expect  from  a  war  under  such  conditions. 

“It  would  be  foolish  to  deny  that  what  we  may  reasonably 
expect  is  defeat,  which  may  be  glorious,  but  all  the  same,  defeat, 
which  would  cause  us  to  lose  the  island  in  the  worst  possible 
manner.  But  even  supposing  an  improbability,  that  is,  that  we 
should  obtain  a  victory,  that  would  not  change  the  final  result  of 
the  campaign.  The  enemy  would  not  declare  itself  defeated,  and 
it  would  be  foolish  for  us  to  pretend  to  overcome  the  United  States 
in  wealth  and  production.  They  would  recover  easily,  while  we 
would  die  of  exhaustion,  although  victorious,  and  the  ultimate 
result  would  be  always  a  disaster.  Only  in  case  we  could  count 
on  some  powerful  ally  could  we  aspire  to  obtain  a  satisfactory 
result. 

*  “But,  besides  having  to  discount  the  high  price  to  be  paid  for 

such  an  alliance,  even  then  we  would  only  be  postponing  the  pres¬ 
ent  conflict  for  a  few  years,  when  it  would  become  graver  than  it 
i  is  to-day,  as  is  the  present  insurrection  in  comparison  with  the 
last. 

‘  ‘  Even  admitting  the  possibility  of  retaining  Cuba,  this  island 
would  cost  us  enormous  sacrifices  by  the  necessity  of  being  con¬ 
stantly  armed  to  the  teeth.  And  here  the  problem  already  pointed 
out  by  somebody  arises :  Is  the  island  worth  the  ruin  of  Spain  ? 
(Silvela  in  Burgos.)  I  do  not  speak  on  the  subject  of  privateering, 
because  it  seems  to  me  that  no  man  acquainted  with  history  can 
attach  any  value  to  privateering  enterprises,  which  nowadays  are 
almost_impossible  on  account  of  the  character  of  modern  vessels. 


14 


“The  accompanying  statement  shows  that  onr  forces  in  the 
Atlantic  are  approximately  one-half  of  those  of  the  United  States, 
both  as  regards  tonnage  and  artillery  power.  I  have  never  thought 
of  the  forces  which  the  United  States  have  in  the  Pacific  and  Asia 
in  connection  with  the  development  of  events  in  the  W est  Indies ; 
but  I  have  always  considered  these  forces  a  great  danger  for  the 
Philippines,  which  have  not  even  a  shadow  of  a  resistance  to  oppose 
to  them.  And  as  regards  the  American  coasts  of  the  Pacific,  the 
United  States  have  no  anxiety  about  them.  I  think  you  are  mis¬ 
taken  in  believing  that  during  the  month  of  April  our  situation 
will  change.  As  I  have  said  above,  I  am  sure  that  neither  the 
Carlos  F,  the  Pelayo ,  the  Vitoria ,  or  the  Numancia  will  be  ready, 
and  Uobody  knows  how  we  will  be  as  regards  14-cm.  ammunition. 
It  seems  sure  that  by  the  end  of  April  the  254-mm.  guns  of  the 
Colon  will  not  be  mounted.  Even  if  I  were  mistaken,  then  our 
available  forces  in  the  West  Indies  would  be  49  per  cent  of  that 
of  the  Americans  in  tonnage,  and  47  per  cent  in  artillery. 

‘  ‘  Our  only  superiority  would  be  in  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers, 
provided  all  of  them  arrive  there  in  good  order. 

“  I  do  not  know  exactly  what  are  the  sentiments  of  the  people 
concerning  Cuba,  but  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  immense 
majority  of  Spaniards  wish  for  peace  above  all  things.  But  those 
who  so  think  are  the  ones  who  suffer  and  weep  inside  of  their  own 
houses,  and  do  not  talk  so  loud  as  the  minority  who  profit  by  the 
continuation  of  this  state  of  affairs.  However,  this  is  a  subject 
which  it  is  not  for  me  to  analyze. 

“  Our  want  of  means  is  such  that  some  days  ago  three  men  went 
overboard  while  manning  the  rail  for  saluting,  through  the  break¬ 
ing  of  an  old  awning  line.  A  new  line  had  been  asked  for  fifty 
days  ago,  but  it  has  not  yet  been  replaced.  In  old  times,  forty- 
three  days  after  the  Hernan  Cortes  was  laid  down  the  vessel  was 
at  sea.  It  is  now  fifty-one  days  since  I  requested  the  changing  of 
certain  tubes  in  the  boilers  of  a  steam  launch  of  the  Teresa ,  and  I 
do  not  yet  know  when  it  will  be  done.  This  will  probably  be  the 
proportion  between  us  and  the  United  States  in  the  repair  of  dam¬ 
ages,  in  spite  of  our  having  the  Havana  dock,  which  is  the  princi¬ 
pal  thing,  but  not  all.  As  for  the  crews,  I  do  not  know  them,  but 
I  may  say  that  the  crews  that  defeated  our  predecessors  at  Trafal¬ 
gar  had  been  recruited  in  the  same  way. 

4  ‘  This  is  my  loyal  opinion,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  nation  I  ex¬ 
press  it  to  the  Government.  If  it  is  thought  advisable  for  me  to 
express  it  personally,  I  am  ready  to  start  at  the  first  intimation. 
After  I  have  done  this,  thus  relieving  my  conscience  of  a  heavy 
weight,  I  am  quite  ready  to  fulfill  the  comparatively  easy  duty  of 
conducting  our  forces  wherever  I  may  be  ordered,  being  sure  that 
all  of  them  will  do  their  duty. 


15 


NORTH  ATLANTIC  SQUADRON. 

SPAIN. 

Protected  vessels  actually  there,  or  unprotected  but  with  a  speed  of  over  15 
miles : 


UNITED  STATES. 


Same  kind  of  vessels : 


Texas 


To  these  may  be  positively  added: 


SPAIN. 


Alfonso  XIII. 


UNITED  STATES. 


Doubtful  additions : 


SPAIN. 


In  the  South  Atlantic  they  have : 


Displacement. 

Artillery. 

..  7,000 

6,130 

.  7, 000 

6,130 

..  1,064 

1,000 

_  8, 200 

6,400 

.  10,288 

9,304 

.  10,288 

9,304 

.  6,815 

550 

-  9,271 

7, 88*0 

,  11,410 

8,360 

.  2, 089 

4,100 

.  2, 089 

4,100 

_  2, 089 

4, 100 

.  3, 600 

2,896 

65, 639 

60, 994 

.  7, 000 

6,130 

.  6, 840 

8, 490* 

.  4, 826 

4, 340 

18, 666 

18, 960 

.  7, 375 

4,  790 

-  7, 375 

4,790 

14, 750 

9,580 

.  9,917 

6,987 

.  9, 260 

5,  620 

19, 167 

12,607 

.  3, 000 

4,270 

.  3,730 

4, 570 

-  4, 500 

4, 470 

.  4, 098 

6,740 

.  4, 324 

7,640 

.  1,485 

700 

.  1,703 

3,320 

22, 840 

31,710 

.  3, 200 

4, 795 

All  the  other  vessels  have  very  little  military  value,  with  the  exception  of  the 
torpedo  boats  and  destroyers,  not  mentioned  in  this  statement,  including  the 
‘  ‘  Katahdin  ”  and  ‘  ‘  Y esuvius.  ” 


Without  the  25-cm.  guns,  the  value  of  which  is  represented  by  1,248. 


16 


CERVERA  WISHED  TO  EXPLAIN  HIS  OPINION  TO  THE  COUNCIL  OF 

MINISTERS. 

Admiral  Cervera’s  already  expressed  desire  to  personally  inform 
the  council  of  ministers  was  still  more  clearly  expressed  under  date 
of  March  16. 

“Yesterday  I  received  your  favor  of  the  day  before,  by  which 
1  see  that  our  opinions  agree  concerning  the  conflict  which  threat¬ 
ens  our  unfortunate  country.  As  both  of  us  are  animated  by  the 
best  desires,  such  agreement  was  sure  to  come.  It  also  appears 
that  the  whole  government  participates  in  this  opinion,  but  I  am 
afraid  that  there  may  be  some  minister  who,  while  believing  that 
we  are  not  in  favorable  conditions,  may  have  been  dazzled  by  the 
names  of  the  vessels  appearing  in  the  general  statement,  and  may 
not  realize  how  crushing  a  disproportion  really  exists,  especially 
if  he  is  not  thoroughly  aware  of  our  lack  of  everything  that  is  nec¬ 
essary  for  a  naval  war,  such  as  supplies,  ammunition,  coal,  etc. 
We  have  nothing  at  all.  If  this  fear  of  mine  is  well  founded,  I 
think  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  whole  council  of 
ministers  without  exception  be  fully  and  clearly  informed  of  our 
terrible  position,  so  that  there  may  not  remain  the  least  doubt  that 
the  war  will  simply  lead  us  to  a  terrible  disaster,  followed  by  a  hu¬ 
miliating  peace  and  the  most  frightful  ruin;  for  which  reason  it 
is  necessary  not  only  to  avoid  the  war  but  to  find  some  solution 
which  will  render  it  impossible  in  the  future.  If  this  is  not  done, 
the  more  time  is  spent,  the  worse  will  be  the  final  result,  whether 
it  is  peace  or  war. 

4  ‘  From  this  reasoning,  as  clear  as  daylight  to  me,  it  appears  that 
since  we  can  not  go  to  war  without  meeting  with  a  certain  and  fright¬ 
ful  disaster,  and  since  we  can  not  treat  directly  with  the  United 
States,  whose  bad  faith  is  notorious,  perhaps  there  is  nothing  left 
for  us  to  do  but  to  settle  the  dispute  through  arbitration  or  media¬ 
tion,  provided  the  enemy  accepts.  However,  this  order  of  consid¬ 
erations  does  not  come  within  my  sphere  of  duty,  which,  as  the 
chief  of  the  squadron,  is  limited  to  reporting  the  state  of  military 
affairs  and  then  carrying  out  the  orders  of  the  Government.  The 
latter,  however,  must  be  fully  informed  of  the  situation.  Before 
dropping  this  subject,  I  must  insist  that  perhaps  it  would  be  well 
for  me  to  verbally  inform  the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  to  say 
that  I  am  ready  to  start  at  the  first  intimation. 

“Concerning  the  available  forces  and  what  may  be  expected  of 
them :  I  will  be  very  glad  if  Ansaldo  carries  out  his  promise  about 
the  254-mm.  guns  of  the  Colon.  The  14-cm.  cartridge  cases  are 
absolutely  necessary.  This  vessel  has  only  thirty,  and  it  is  to  be 
supposed  that  the  stores  of  the  Oquendo  and  Vizcaya  are  not  better 
supplied.  For  the  present  the  firm  is  supplying  only  one  hundred 


17 


per  week;  and  supposing  that  the  first  ones  have  already  arrived 
or  will  arrive  in  Cadiz  one  of  these  days,  at  this  rate  we  won’t 
have  finished  until  October.  Then  they  have  to  be  charged,  there¬ 
fore  they  can  never  be  ready  in  time  for  the  present  conflict.  I 
thought  I  would  have  the  first  ones  by  January,  and  I  will  not 
have  them  until  April.  The  engines  of  the  Pelayo  are  ready  and 
the  vessel  can  sail,  but  how  about  the  secondary  battery  and  the 
armored  redoubt?  These  will  not  be  ready.  If  the  old  battery 
could  be  mounted !  But  I  doubt  it ;  the  ports  will  not  permit  it. 
I  have  heard  it  said  that  the  crew  which  brought  the  Pelayo  was 
taken  from  the  Vitoria ,  which  is  another  proof  of  our  excessive 
poverty.  It  will  be  very  well  if  the  Carlos  V  is  soon  ready,  but 
I  understand  that  the  10-cm.  battery  has  not  yet  been  mounted, 
and  then  the  trials  are  to  be  made. 

“I  never  had  great  confidence  in  the  purchasing  of  vessels.  Too 
much  fuss  is  made  over  every  detail  by  ignorant  people.  It  was 
through  this  that  we  lost  the  Garibaldi ,  and  now  we  have  lost  the 
Brazilian  cruisers.  In  fact,  we  have  only  secured  the  Colon ,  an 
excellent  ship,  but  which  has  not  yet  arrived,  and  the  Valdes.  And 
supposing  that  we  had  everything  our  own  way,  and  that  Provi¬ 
dence  should  grant  us  a  victory,  which  is  highly  improbable,  we 
would  then  find  ourselves  in  the  condition  explained  in  my  last, 
and  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  repeat.  It  only  rests  for  me  now 
to  be  informed  of  the  destination  of  the  fleet.  I  believe  the  Teresa 
ought  to  be  in  Cadiz,  where  the  cartridge  cases  are  to  be  recharged, 
and  she  could  sail  as  soon  as  all  her  guns  were  mounted. 

‘‘I  will  insist  no  more,  but  the  voice  of  my  conscience,  animated 
by  my  love  for  my  country,  tells  me  that  in  saying  this  I  am  ful¬ 
filling  my  unavoidable  duty.” 

CONDITION  OF  THE  FLEET  IMMEDIATELY  BEFORE  THE  WAR. 

In  the  month  of  April,  shortly  before  the  war,  Cervera  wrote : 

“  My  fears  are  realized.  The  conflict  is  coming  fast  upon  us ;  and 
the  Colon  has  not  received  her  big  guns ;  the  Carlos  Phas  not  been 
delivered,  and  her  10-cm.  artillery  is  not  yet  mounted;  the  Pelayo 
is  not  ready  for  want  of  finishing  her  redoubt,  and,  I  believe,  her 
secondary  battery;  the  Vitoria  has  no  artillery,  and  of  the 
Numancia  we  had  better  not  speak. 

“But  after  all  I  am  glad  the  end  is  coming.  The  country  can 
stand  this  state  of  affairs  no  longer,  and  any  arrangement  will  be 
a  good  one,  however  bad  it  looks,  if  it  comes  without  our  having 
to  lament  a  great  disaster,  as  may  happen  if  we  go  to  war  with  a 
few  half-armed  vessels,  and  without  want  of  means  and  excess  of 
incumbrances.  ” 


18 


A  few  days  afterwards  lie  wrote: 

4 4  On  account  of  the  general  anxiety  it  is  very  important  to  think 
of  what  is  to  be  done,  so  that,  if  the  case  arises,  we  may  act  rap¬ 
idly  and  with  some  chance  of  efficiency,  and  not  he  groping  about 
in  the  dark,  or  like  Don  Quixote,  go  out  to  fight  windmills  and 
come  hack  with  broken  heads. 

4  4  If  our  naval  forces  were  superior  to  those  of  the  U nited  States, 
the  question  would  he  an  easy  one.  All  we  would  have  to  do 
would  he  to  bar  their  way.  But  on  the  contrary  our  forces  are 
very  inferior  to  theirs.  To  endeavor  to  bar  their  way,  which 
could  only  he  done  by  giving  them  a  decisive  naval  battle,  would 
he  the  greatest  of  follies.  That  would  simply  mean  a  sure  defeat, 
which  would  leave  us  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  who  would  easily 
take  a  good  position  in  the  Canaries,  establish  there  a  base  of  oper¬ 
ations,  crush  our  commerce,  and  safely  bombard  our  maritime 
cities.  It  is  therefore  absolutely  necessary  to  decide  what  we  are 
going  to  do,  and  without  disclosing  our  proposed  movements,  be 
in  a  position  to  act  when  the  time  comes. 

4  4  This  was  the  substance  of  my  telegram,  and  my  ideas  have 
not  changed  since  then.  If  we  are  caught  without  a  war  plan, 
there  will  be  vacillations  and  doubts ;  and,  after  defeat,  there  may 
come  humiliation  and  shame.” 

On  the  eve  of  the  war  Cervera  justly  lamented  the  lack  of  a 
plan  as  follows : 

44 1  regret  very  much  to  have  to  sail  without  having  agreed  upon 
some  plan,  even  in  general  lines,  for  which  purpose  I  repeatedly 
requested  permission  to  go  to  Madrid.  From  the  bulk  of  the  tele¬ 
grams  received  I  think  I  see  that  the  government  persists  in  the 
idea  of  sending  the  little  squadron  (torpedo-boat  flotilla)  to  Cuba. 
That  seems  to  me  a  very  risky  adventure,  which  may  cost  us  very 
dear,  for  the  loss  of  our  flotilla  and  the  defeat  of  our  squadron  in 
the  Caribbean  Sea  entails  a  great  danger  for  the  Canaries,  and  per¬ 
haps  the  bombardment  of  our  coast  cities.  I  do  not  mention  the 
fate  of  the  island  of  Cuba  because  I  have  anticipated  it  long  ago.- 
A  naval  defeat  would  only  precipitate  its  ultimate  loss,  while  if 
left  to  defend  itself  with  its  present  means,  perhaps  it  would  give 
the  Americans  some  annoyance.  We  must  not  deceive  ourselves 
concerning  the  strength  of  our  fleet.  If  our  correspondence  of  the 
last  two  months  is  looked  over  it  will  be  seen  not  that  I  have  been 
a  prophet,  but  that  I  have  fallen  short  of  the  true  mark.  Let  us 
not  have  any  illusions  as  to  what  we  can  do.” 

The  last  documents  relating  to  the  sailing  of  the  fleet  from  Cape 
Verde  are  the  most  interesting.  They  show  what  was  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  the  vessels  on  the  19th  of  April,  the  day  before  the  rupture 
of  relations.  Admiral  Cervera  wrote  from  Saint  Vincent,  Cape 
Verde : 


19 


‘ 4  The  boilers  of  the  Ariete  are  practically  out  of  service,  so  that 
this  vessel,  instead  of  being  an  element  of  power,  is  the  nightmare 
of  the  fleet.  She  could  only  be  used  for  port  defense.  The  boilers 
of  the  Azov  are  eleven  years  old,  and  are  of  the  locomotive  type. 
As  for  the  Furor  and  Terror ,  their  bow  plates  give  as  soon  as  they 
t  are  in  a  sea  way,  and  some  of  their  frames  have  been  broken. 

The  Fluton  had  an  accident  of  this  kind  when  coming  from  Eng¬ 
land,  and  had  her  bows  strengthened  at  Ferrol. 
i  “I  do  not  know  whether  the  port  of  San  Juan  de  Puerto  Rico 

affords  good  protection  for  the  fleet.  If  it  does  not,  and  if  the 
port  of  Mayaguez  can  not  be  effectively  closed,  the  fleet  would  be 
in  a  most  unfavorable  position.  However,  before  forming  a  judg¬ 
ment,  I  shall  await  the  arrival  of  the  Vizcaya ,  whose  captain, 
Eulate,  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with  Puerto  Rico.  I  am  con¬ 
stantly  preoccupied  about  the  Canaries.  It  will  be  necessary  to 
close  and  fortify  the  port  of  Graciosa  Island,  as  well  as  the  island 
commanding  the  port  of  La  Luz  in  Grand  Canary. 

“The  idea  of  sending  the  fleet  to  Cuba  seems  to  have  been 
abandoned,  I  believe  very  wisely. 

“Concerning  Puerto  Rico,  I  have  often  wondered  whether  it 
would  be  wise  to  accumulate  there  all  our  forces,  and  I  do  not 
think  so.  If  Puerto  Rico  is  faithful,  it  will  not  be  such  an  easy 
job  for  the  Yankees;  if  it  is  not  faithful,  it  will  inevitably  follow 
the  same  fate  as  Cuba,  at  least  as  regards  us. 

“On  the  other  hand,  I  am  very  much  afraid  for  the  Philippines 
and  the  Canaries,  as  I  have  said  before ;  and  above  all,  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  a  bombardment  of  our  coast,  which  is  not  impossible, 
considering  the  audacity  of  the  Yankees,  and  counting,  as  they 
do,  with  four  or  five  vessels  of  higher  speed  than  our  own.  For 
all  these  reasons,  I  am  doubtful  as  to  what  it  would  be  best  for 
me  to  do ;  and  I  will  not  take  any  decision  without  the  opinion  of 
the  council  of  captains,  as  prescribed  by  the  ordinances. 

‘ 4 1  leave  this  letter  open  until  to-morrow,  in  case  something 
should  happen. 

“I  have  just  now  been  informed  that  the  Vizcaya  and  Oquendo 
are  in  sight.  I  have  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  them  come  in  and 
%  of  greeting  their  captains.  The  crews  are  in  the  best  of  health 
and  spirits,  but  the  Vizcaya  needs  docking  badly.  During  the 
trip  from  Puerto  Rico  she  burned  200  tons  more  than  the  Oquendo , 
which  means  a  diminution  of  her  speed  of  from  3  to  5  knots  accord¬ 
ing  to  my  reckoning,  and  a  diminution  of  her  sphere  of  action  of 
from  25  to  35  per  cent,  thus  losing  the  advantage  of  speed.  Both 
are  now  coaling,  but  it  is  a  long  job,  for,  unfortunately,  we  do  not 
feel  at  home  here.  We  are  indeed  unlucky!” 


20 


COUNCIL  OF  WAR  OF  THE  COMMANDERS  OF  THE  FLEET. 

It  is  well  known  that  before  the  sailing  of  the  squadron  the  com¬ 
manders  of  the  vesels  held  a  council  of  war  on  board  the  Colon ,  on 
April  21. 

This  is  what  Cervera  wrote : 

“The  council  lasted  nearly  four  hours.  The  prevailing  spirit 
was  of  the  purest  discipline,  characterized  by  the  high  spirit  which 
animates  the  whole  fleet,  and  especially  the  distinguished  com¬ 
manders,  who  are  an  honor  to  Spain  and  the  navy,  and  whom  it 
is  my  fortune  to  have  as  companions  in  these  critical  circum¬ 
stances.  The  first  and  natural  desire  expressed  by  all  was  to  go 
resolutely  in  quest  of  the  enemy,  and  to  surrender  their  lives  on 
the  altar  of  the  mother  country ;  but  the  vision  of  this  same  mother 
country  abandoned,  insulted,  and  trod  upon  by  the  enemy,  proud 
of  our  defeat — for  nothing  else  can  be  expected  by  going  to  meet 
them  on  their  own  ground  with  our  inferior  forces — forced  them 
to  see  that  such  sacrifice  would  not  only  be  useless  but  harmful, 
since  it  would  place  the  mother  country  in  the  hands  of  an  inso¬ 
lent  and  proud  enemy,  and  God  only  knows  what  the  consequences 
might  be.  I  could  see  the  struggle  in  their  minds  between  these 
conflicting  considerations.  All  of  them  loathe  the  idea  of  not 
going  immediately  in  search  of  the  enemy,  and  finishing  once  and 
for  all.  But,  as  I  said  before,  the  specter  of  the  country  violated 
by  the  enemy  rose  above  all  other  considerations,  and,  inspiring 
themselves  with  that  courage  which  consists  in  braving  criticism 
and  perhaps  the  sarcasm  and  accusations  of  the  ignorant  masses, 
which  know  nothing  about  war  in  general  and  naval  warfare 
in  particular,  and  which  believe  that  the  Alfonso  XIII  or  the 
Cristina  can  be  pitted  against  the  Ioiva  or  Massachusetts ,  they 
expressly  and  energetically  declared  that  the  interests  of  the 
mother  country  demanded  this  sacrifice  from  us. 

“One  of  the  captains  had  certain  scruples  about  expressing  his 
opinion,  saying  that  he  would  do  what  the  Government  of  His 
Majesty  should  be  pleased  to  order;  but  as  all  of  us,  absolutely  all, 
shared  these  sentiments — it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say — his  scruples 
were  soon  overcome.  Another  of  the  captains,  certainly  not  the 
most  enthusiastic,  but  who  may  be  said  to  have  represented  the  aver¬ 
age  opinion  prevailing  in  the  council,  has  written,  by  my  order, 
his  ideas,  which  reflect,  better  than  I  could  express  them,  the  opin¬ 
ions  of  all.  This  document  exactly  expresses  the  opinion  which 
prevailed  in  the  meeting. 

“An  act  was  signed  in  which  it  was  stated  that,  having  met  by 
order  of  the  commander  in  chief  and  under  his  presidency,  the  sec¬ 
ond  in  command  and  the  captains  of  the  vessels,  the  president  sub¬ 
mitted  to  discussion  the  following  point : 


21 


“  ‘Under  the  present  circumstances  of  the  mother  country,  is  it 
expedient  that  this  fleet  should  go  at  once  to  America,  or  should 
it  stay  to  protect  our  coasts  and  the  Canaries,  and  to  provide  for 
any  contingency?’ 

“Several  opinions  were  exchanged  concerning  the  probable  con¬ 
sequences  of  our  campaign  in  the  W est  Indies ;  the  great  deficien- 
t  cies  of  our  fleet  compared  with  that  of  the  enemy  were  made  man- 

f  if  est,  as  well  as  the  very  scanty  resources  which  the  islands  of 

Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  are  able  to  offer  for  the  purpose  of  estab¬ 
lishing  a  base  of  operations.  In  consideration  of  this,  and  the  grave 
consequences  for  the  nation  of  a  defeat  of  our  fleet  in  Cuba,  thus 
leaving  unobstructed  the  coming  of  the  enemy  against  the  Penin¬ 
sula  and  adjacent  islands,  it  was  unanimously  agreed  to  call  the 
attention  of  the  Government,  by  means  of  a  telegram,  in  which 
the  commander  in  chief  of  the  squadron,  in  agreement  with  the 
second  in  command  and  the  commanders  of  the  vessels,  suggested 
to  go  to  the  Canaries.  The  Ariete — it  said — boilers  in  bad  condi¬ 
tion,  those  of  the  Azor  very  old,  Vizcaya  needs  docking  to  paint 
bottom  if  speed  is  to  be  maintained.  Canaries  would  be  protected 
against  a  rapid  descent  of  the  enemy,  and  all  the  forces  would  be 
in  a  position,  if  necessary,  promptly  to  come  to  the  defense  of  the 
mother  country.” 


OPINION  OF  SENOR  CONCAS. 

The  opinion  of  Captain  Victor  M.  Concas,  commander  of  the 
battle  ship  Infanta  Maria  Teresa, concerning  the  subjects  presented 
for  discussion  by  the  admiral  of  the  fleet  at  the  council  of  war 
held  on  board  the  Cristobal  Colon ,  was  as  follows : 

“(1)  That  the  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  are  so  immensely 
superior  to  our  own  in  number  and  class  of  vessels,  armor  and 
artillery,  and  in  preparations  made — besides  the  advantage  given 
them  by  the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  the  possible  one  in  Puerto  Rico, 
and  the  one  still  existing  in  the  East — that  they  have  sufficient 
forces  to  attack  us  in  the  West  Indies,  in  the  Peninsula  and  adja¬ 
cent  islands,  and  in  the  Philippines.  That  since  no  attention  has 
been  paid  to  that  archipelago,  which  was  perhaps  the  most  urgent, 
in  order  to  reduce  our  vulnerable  points,  and  which  could  have 
been  done  with  a  single  battle  ship,  to-day  any  division  of  our  lim¬ 
ited  forces  and  any  separation  from  the  European  seas  involves  a 
strategic  mistake  which  would  bring  war  to  the  Peninsula,  a 
frightful  disaster  to  our  coasts,  the  payment  of  large  ransoms,  and 
perhaps  the  loss  of  some  island.  As  soon  as  this  fleet  leaves  for 
the  W est  Indies  it  is  evident — as  has  happened  already  more  than 
once  (sic) — that  the  American  flying  squadron  will  sail  for  Europe ; 
and  even  if  its  purpose  was  only  to  make  a  raid  or  a  demonstration 


22 


against  our  coasts,  the  just  alarm  of  all  Spain  would  cause  the 
enforced  return  of  this  fleet,  although  too  late  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  reaping  the  fruits  of  its  easy  victory. 

4  4  The  only  three  vessels  of  war  remaining  for  the  defense  of  the 
Peninsula,  the  Carlos  V ,  the  Pelayo,  whose  repairs  are  not  yet 
finished,  and  the  Alfonso  XIII ,  of  very  little  speed,  are  not 
enough  for  the  defense  of  Spain,  and  in  no  way  for  that  of  the  \ 

Canaries.  The  yacht  Giralda  and  the  steamers  Germania  and 
Normania  are  vessels  of  no  fighting  qualities  and  add  no  strength 
to  our  navy. 

4  4  (2)  The  plan  of  defending  the  island  of  Puerto  Rico,  abandon¬ 
ing  Cuba  to  its  fate,  is  absolutely  impossible,  because,  if  the 
American  fleet  purposely  destroys  a  city  of  the  last-named  island, 
in  spite  of  all  the  plans  of  the  government  upon  the  subject,  and 
even  if  it  should  be  the  maddest  thing  in  the  world,  the  govern¬ 
ment  itself  would  be  forced  by  public  opinion  to  send  this  fleet 
against  the  Americans,  under  the  conditions  and  at  the  point  the 
latter  might  choose. 

“(3)  Even  deciding  upon  the  defense  of  Puerto  Rico  alone,  the 
trip  across  to-day,  after  the  practical  declaration  of  war,  without 
a  military  port  where  the  fleet  might  reorganize  itself  on  its  arri¬ 
val,  and  without  an  auxiliary  fleet  to  keep  the  enemy  busy — who, 

I  suppose,  will  make  St.  Thomas  its  base  of  operations — is  a  strate¬ 
gic  error  the  more  deplorable  because  there  have  been  months  and 
even  years  of  time  to  accumulate  the  necessary  forces  in  the  West 
Indies.  It  seems  probable,  judging  from  the  information  acquired, 
that  the  supplies  accumulated  at  St.  Thomas  are  intended  by  the 
enemy  to  establish  a  base  of  operations  in  the  vicinity  of  our  un¬ 
protected  Vieques  (Vierges).  For  all  these  reasons  the  responsi¬ 
bility  of  the  trip  must  remain  entirely  with  the  government. 

4  4  (4)  Adding  these  three  battle  ships  and  the  Cristobal  Colon , 
without  its  big  guns,  to  the  two  remaining  in  the  Peninsula  and  to 
the  few  and  old  torpedo  boats  which  we  have  left,  it  is  possible  to 
defend  our  coast  from  the  Guadiana  to  Cape  Creus,  including  the  ? 
Balearic  and  the  Canaries,  thanks  to  the  distance  of  the  enemy 
from  its  base  of  operations.  This  defense,  however,  will  have  to 
be  a  very  energetic  one  if  the  enemy  brings  its  best  ships  to  bear  J 
on  us. 

4  4 (5)  It  is  very  regrettable  that  there  are  not  enough  vessels  to 
cover  all  points  at  one  time ;  but  duty  and  true  patriotism  compel 
us  to  clearly  express  the  resources  which  the  country  gave  us,  and 
the  necessities  which  present  circumstances  bring  on  the  country 
in  danger. 

4  4  (6)  Lastly,  I  believe  that  the  military  situation  should  be  made 
known  to  the  minister  of  marine,  reiterating  our  profoundest  subor¬ 
dination  to  his  orders,  and  our  firm  purpose  most  energetically  to 


carry  out  the  plans  of  operations  he  may  communicate  to  these 
forces.  But  after  pointing  out  the  probable  consequences,  the 
*  responsibility  must  remain  with  the  government.” 

FROM  CAPE  VERDE. 

Finally,  on  April  22,  the  Admiral  said : 

“  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  give  an  idea  of  the  surprise  and  aston¬ 
ishment  experienced  by  all  on  the  receipt  of  the  order  to  sail. 
Indeed  that  surprise  is  well  justified,  for  nothing  can  be  expected 
of  this  expedition  except  the  total  destruction  of  the  fleet  or  its 
hasty  and  demoralizing  return ;  when  here  in  Spain  it  might  be  the 
safeguard  of  the  nation. 

“You  talk  about  plans,  and  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts  to  have  some 
laid  out,  as  it  was  wise  and  prudent,  my  desires  have  been  disap¬ 
pointed.  How  can  it  be  said  that  I  have  been  supplied  with  every¬ 
thing  I  asked  for  ?  The  Colon  has  not  yet  her  big  guns,  and  I  asked 
for  the  bad  ones  if  there  were  no  others.  The  14-cm.  ammunition, 
with  the  exception  of  about  300  shots,  is  bad.  The  defective  guns 
of  the  Vizcaya  and  Oquendo  have  not  been  changed.  The  car¬ 
tridge  cases  of  the  Colon  can  not  be  recharged.  We  have  not  a 
single  Bustamante  torpedo.  There  is  no  plan  or  concert,  which  I 
so  much  desired  and  called  for  so  often.  The  repairs  of  the  ser¬ 
vomotors  of  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  and  the  Vizcaya  were  only 
made  after  they  had  left  Spain.  In  short,  this  is  already  a  disaster, 
and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  it  will  be  a  more  frightful  one  before 
long.  And  perhaps  everything  could  be  changed  yet !  But  I  sup¬ 
pose  it  is  too  late  now  for  anything  that  is  not  the  ruin  and  the 
desolation  of  our  country. 

4  4  The  Vizcaya  can  no  longer  steam,  and  she  is  only  a  boil  in  the 
body  of  the  fleet. 

“But  I  insist  no  more.  The  act  has  been  done,  and  I  will  try  to 
find  the  best  way  out  of  this  direful  enterprise.” 

The  following  are  the  last  letters  we  know  of : 

“Saint  Vincent  (Cape  Verde),  April  2 If,  1898. 

“I  have  just  received  the  telegram  ordering  us  to  start,  and  I 
have  given  orders  to  tranship  from  the  Cadiz  to  these  vessels  coal, 
supplies,  crews,  and  the  artillery  of  the  destroyers,  which  was  on 
board  the  Cadiz. 

44 1  intended  to  sail  without  finishing  the  provisioning  of  the 
vessels,  but  since  the  Cadiz  is  to  stay,  I  have  decided  to  ship  as 
much  coal  as  possible.  I  will  try  to  sail  to-morrow. 

“As  the  act  has  been  consummated,  I  will  not  insist  upon  my 
opinion  of  it.  May  God  grant  that  I  be  mistaken!  You  see  I 


24 


1 

l 

inn 

III 

1 

III 

l 

L 

3  01 

u/ 

o 

CM 

■  ^ 

00 

r83i 

52 

A 

was  right  when  I  said  that  by  the  end  of  April  the  Pelayo ,  Carlos 
V ,  Vitoria ,  and  Numancia  would  not  be  finished ;  the  Colon  would 
not  have  its  big  guns,  unless  we  took  the  bad  ones,  and  we  wonld 
not  have  the  new  14- cm.  ammunition  with  which  to  fight,  etc. 

“With  an  easy  conscience  I  go  to  the  sacrifice,  but  I  can  not 
understand  that  decision  of  the  navy  *  general  officers  against  my 
opinions. 

“  I  have  been  informed  of  the  sailing  of  a  cargo  of  coal  for  Puerto 
Rico,  where  it  is  supposed  to  arrive  on  the  11th  or  12th  of  May, 
but  I  am  afraid  lest  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

“It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  I  can  accept  or  avoid  a  naval 
battle  at  will.  The  Vizcaya,  on  account  of  her  stay  in  Havana 
and  the  nine  months  without  cleaning  her  bottom,  is  nothing  but 
a  buoy,  and  I  can  not  abandon  her.” 


ONE  TELEGRAM  FROM  VILLAAMIL. 

“At  Sea,  May  5,  1898. 

“Dear  Juan:  To  complete  our  collection  of  documents,  I  think 
you  should  have  the  inclosed  copy  of  a  private  telegram  from 
Villaamil  to  Sagasta.  I  send  you  this  letter  by  means  of  two 
destroyers  which  I  am  sending  to  Martinique  in  search  of  news. 
All  is  well  on  board,  and  the  spirit  is  excellent.  We  shall  see  what 
God  has  in  store  for  us.  The  final  result  is  not  doubtful,  but  if 
only  we  could  start  with  a  good  lucky  stroke !  God  be  with  us ! 
Good-by.  Regards  to  your  folk,  etc. 

“Pascual”  (Cervera’s  first  name). 


[Copy  of  Telegram.] 


April  22,  1898. 

Praxedes  Sagasta,  Madrid: 

In  view  of  importance  to  the  country  of  destination  of  this  fleet, 
I  deem  it  expedient  you  should  know,  through  a  friend  who  does 
not  fear  censure,  that,  while  as  seamen  we  are  all  ready  to  die 
with  honor  in  the  fulfillment  of  duty,  I  think  it  undoubted  that 
the  sacrifice  of  these  naval  forces  will  be  as  certain  as  it  will  be 
fruitless  and  useless  for  the  termination  of  the  war,  if  the  repre¬ 
sentations  repeatedly  made  by  admiral  to  minister  of  marine  are 
not  taken  into  consideration. 


F.  Villaamil. 


*  In  a  council  of  eighteen  general  officers,  fourteen  voted  for  the  immediate 
sailing  of  Cervera’s  fleet  from  Cape  Verde.  Generals  Gomez,  Imaz,  and  Lazaga 
voted  against  it  until  the  reenforcement  of  the  fleet  by  the  Pelayo,  Carlos  V, 
Alfonso  XIII,  and  Lepanto  and  the  three  destroyers  remaining  in  the  Peninsula. 
Generals  Butler  and  Mozo  shared  this  opinion  conditionally,  subordinating  it  to 
the  decision  of  the  government. 


O 


